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RECENT CASES
AERIAL LAW-LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-RULE
APPLICABLE IN CASE OF DAMAGE TO PROPERTY ON GROUND CAUSED BY CRASH

OF AIRCRAFT-Defendant aeronaut, while making a forced landing because of
an undetermined engine defect, crashed into plaintiff's electric transmission
tower. Held, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable; that defendant, however, even though free from fault, was liable for the actual damage.
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849 (N. Y. 1933).
The principal opinion constitutes the first attempt by a court to analyze
the highly controversial I and much discussed 2 but heretofore judicially unanswered 3 problem of determining which of the conflicting legal concepts should
be applied to the situation where an aircraft, by reason of an unavoidable accident, falls and damages property on the ground. The normal tort approach of
requiring the plaintiff to designate affirmatively defendant's fault is impractical
here because plaintiff has no means of ascertaining the exact cause of his
injury. Thus, some alternative technique is sought to aid the plaintiff. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, advocated by some writers 4 as a procedural device
to produce the facts ' was rejected by the court in the principal case. It was
pointed out that, as an aircraft is not unlikely to crash even though there be no
wrongful conduct, 6 the doctrine cannot here be utilized, since its rationale
depends upon an occurrence which, according to the common experience of
mankind, probably would not have happened but for negligence.7 Likewise, the
concept of trespass quare clausumn fregit, sometimes employed to impose liability
'At the present time there is in progress, between the American Law Institute, the
Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American Bar Association, and the Special Committee
on Uniform Aeronautics Acts of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a controversy
as to the correct concept to be applied. See Report of the Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American Bar Association (1933) U. S. Av. REP. 259, 262; HANDBOOK OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMrISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS AND PROCEEDINGS

(1932) 306.
2 See Osterhout, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation (i3i)

2

Am L. REv. 9; Allen, Transportation by Air and the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (193o)

16 A. B. A. J. 455; Schneider, Negligence in the Law of Aviation. (1932) 12 B. U. L. REV.
17; Newman, Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases (1929) 29 Col. L. REv. 2O39; Stites,
Negligence in the Operation of Aircraft (193o) 18 Ky. L. J. 141; Hirschberg, The Liability
of the Aviator to Third Persons (1929) 2 So. CALIF.REV. 4o5; Hearne, The Liability of an
Aviator for Damage to Persons and Property on the Ground (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 269.
' The principal case is the only one in which conflicting theories are discussed. In Guille
v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N. Y. 1822) (balloon descended on land and caused a crowd to
invade plaintiff's land) the liability for the damage done by the crowd was placed upon the
aeronaut on the basis of trespass. In Sollak v. New York, (1929) U. S. Av. REP. 42 (N. Y.
1927); (293o) I Am L. REv. 478 (aircraft crashed upon automobile traveling on public
highway) it is not clear upon what concept liability was based. In Kirschner v. Jones and
White (1932) U. S. Av. REP. 278 (N. J. 1932) (plane crashed into house) only a memorandum decision is given.
* Schneider, supra note 2, at 25 ; Stites, supra note 2, at 147.
The legal effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is evidentiary and not substantive.
Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, 287 Fed. 797 (C. C. A. 3d 1923) ; Zahniser et al. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 19o Pa. 350, 42 Atl. 7o7 (1899); Heckle and Harper, Effect of the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 724. But see Note (1925) 23 MICH.

L.

REV.

785.

'Principal case at 851; Allen, supra note 2, at 457 and 458.
'Principal case at 851; Glaser v. Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N. E. 809 (1929);
(193o) 28 MicH. L. REv. 940; Griffon v. Manice, 166 N. Y. i88, 59 N. E. 925 (19Ol);
HARPER, TORTS (1933) 183; Heckle and Harper, supra note 5.
' In the situations both of careful blasting and of falling aircraft, the defendant has intentionally set in motion a force which causes an intrusion on the plaintiff's land of foreign
matter, against which invasion the plaintiff is unable to guard.
(278)
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in the closely analogous$ situation of the intrusion of foreign matter upon land
by reason of a carefully conducted blasting operation 0 is technically unavailable
here as the mere entry is excused because of the exigency of the emergency.' 0
However, as this is the type of situation in which, although every possible precaution be taken to avoid injury, the mere undertaking of the act involves an
irreducible minimum of risk of causing damage to others, liability without fault
should be imposed."' As the aeronaut realizes a forced landing will necessitate
the use of another's property, social expediency demands that the actual damage
should be borne by him who avails himself of the property of another."'
Furthermore, although the crash may occur from inevitable causes, that fact
should not excuse the aeronaut, for in undertaking the flight he may be taken
to anticipate that causes beyond his control may force him to inflict damage 1"
which it is unreasonable to require the landowner to assume as one of his normal
risks.' 4
BANKS AND BANKING-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF COIMMERCIAL BANK TO SET-OFF OF NOTE OF MUNICIPALITY AGAINST GENERAL DEPOSIT

-A bank, holding an overdue improvement note of a township, charged the
township treasurer's general deposit account with the balance due upon this note.
The township committee sued the bank to recover the money deposited; the
bank sought to justify its action by set-off of its claim under the note. Held,
(three justices dissenting) that the bank was not entitled to a set-off as between
the two claims since the moneys on general deposit represented a trust fund of
current revenues devoted to particular purposes. Township Committee v. First
National Bank, 168 Atl. 757 (N. J. 1933).
A lawful general deposit of money with a commercial bank is generally held
to create a mere debtor-creditor relationship,' whether the depositor be an
'Ex parte Birmingham Realty Co., 183 Ala. 444, 63 So. 67 (1913) ; Hay v. Cohoes Co.,
2 N. Y. 159 (1849); Rafferty v. Davis, 26o Pa. 563, 1O3 At. 951 (ii8); HARIE, TORTS
406; TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1931) Tentative Draft No. 7, § Ion, illustration 7.
" Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 Atl. 188 (igo8) ; TORTS RESTATEmENT supra note 9,
§ 1OO2, comment g to clause (c).
'In the situation where strict liability is imposed, although the undertaking of the act is
not unreasonable in view of the social utility of such activity, the danger from such conduct
is such that the person carrying on the activity is so greatly benefited in comparison to the
loss that may be incurred, that he should bear whatever damage is done. This doctrine has
been applied to the following situations: Dangerous substances, having been collected on the
land by the occupier, escape. Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 33o (1868), see Bohlen,
The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (911)
59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 298; Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928) ; Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 145 Pa. 324,
22 Atl. 649 (89I).
Cattle and other domestic animals invade another's premises. Gresham
v. Taylor, 51 Ala. 505 (1874) ; McKee v. Trisler, 311 Ill. 536, 143 N. E. 69 (1924). Contra:
Sprague v. Freemont, etc., R. Co., 6 Dak. 86, 5o N. W. 617 (1888); Delancy v. Errickson,
IO Neb. 492, 6 N. W. 600. Invasion of an interest other than exclusive possession of real
property by wild animals. Marquet v. LaDuke, 6 Mich. 596, 55 N. W. OO6 (i896) ; Opelt
v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 Pac. 241 (1919). Invasion of real property by
means of a careful blasting. Supra note 9. It has also been extended to situations where
the defendant is carrying on an ultra-hazardous activity. Exner v. Sherman Power Const.
Co., 54 F. (2d) 510 (931)
(defendant was transporting dynamite), (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L.
REv. g24.
I Cf. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., log Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221 (1910);
HARPER, TORTS (1933)

139.

" Hearne, supra note 2, at 278 and 279.

"See Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause (1932) 30 MIcEr. L. REv.
1001, 1005 et seq. See generally note 8, supra.
I MoRSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 186; 2 id. § 568; I PERRY, TRUSTS
(7th ed. 1929) § 122; TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) Tentative Draft No. i, § 15,
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individual, 2 private corporation,3 municipality,4 or a state., While a preference
may be created in the bank's assets in favor of a depositor by statute,6 judicial
decision 7 or express agreement,8 it would seem illogical to hold that a deposit of
money is a trust fund in absence of a manifestation of intention by the depositor
or the legislature that the bank shall keep the deposit separate from its general
funds.' The instant opinion, moreover, denied to the bank the right of set-off
despite a statute which provided that in any action by a plaintiff municipality,
the defendant might set up by way of set-off or counterclaim any demand which
it had against the plaintiff, "and the same shall be conmsidered upon the trial of
such action".10 The reasoning of the majority that the counterclaim was "considered" by giving judgment for the bank thereon as a basis for mandamu
proceedings would seem to render the statute nugatory."1 The majority's obvious
desire to protect immediate municipal functions at any cost ignores the probability that its very purpose may be defeated by a resultant reluctance of banks
to make municipal loans. The decision further ignores the danger to the banking structure through the temporary freezing of municipal debts which is necessarily consequent. 2

CONFLICT OF LAWS-SURVIVAL OF ACTIONs-LAw GOVERNING SURVIVAL
IN SUIT AGAINST EXECUTOR FOR Tonrr OF DECEDENT CoMImTTED IN FOREIGN
JURISDIcTION-Under a Pennsylvania statute, "[executors] shall be liable to
comment h; Note (ig3i) io Tax. L. REv. 71. It naturally follows that the bank may charge
matured debts of the kind presented in the instant case to the debtor-depositor's general
account, or it may set off such debt in proceedings brought by such depositor to recover his
funds on general deposit, Hemphill v. Florida National Bank, 3o F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 5th,
1929) ; Laighton v. Brookline Trust Co., 225 Mass. 458, 114 N. E. 671 (1917) ; Georges
Township v. Union Trust Co., 293 Pa. 364, 143 Atl. iO (1928) (contra the principal case on
identical facts). Contra: Thomas v. Marine Bank, 156 La. 942, 101 So. 315 (1924).
SLaighton v. Brookline Trust Co., supra note i; Hodgin v. Peoples' National Bank, 124
N. C. 540,32 S. E. 887 (1899).
'Marmon Fanning Co. v. Peoples' National Bank, io6 N. J. Eq. 170, 15o Atl. 402 (1929).
'Hemphill v. Florida National Bank; Georges Township v. Union Trust Co., both supra
note I; Otis v. Gross, 96 Ill. 612 (i88o) ; City of Sturgis v. Meade County Bank, 38 S. D.
317, 161 N. W. 327 (1917) ; Meier, PreferentialRights to Public F, nds Deposited in an
Insolvent Bank (1930) 4 CIN. L. Rav. 39.
'Denny, Banking Comm'r v. Thompson, 236 Ky. 714, 33 S. W. (2d) 670 (193o).
'3Citizens' Bank v. Rowan County Board, 245 Ky. 384, 53 S. W. (2d) 549 (932).
' Thomas v. Marine Bank, supra note i.
'Joy v. Grasse, 173 Minn. 289, 217 N. W. 365 (ig7); Bollow v. Farmers' Bank, 45
S. W. (2d) 882 (Mo. App. 1932).
'For an unusually clear exposition of the impracticability of holding that such general
deposits are trust funds, see Georges Township v. Union Trust Co., supra note I. On the
same situation presented by the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, following the
majority of decisions, held that if the money deposited by the treasurer was intended to be
earmarked for a designated township use, the bank should be notified. See, further, I PERRY,
loc. cit. supra note I.
" N. J. Coinp. STAT. (Supp. 1930) p. 1177. (Italics added.)
' This statute, when read in conjunction with the general set-off act, N. J. CoMp. STAT.
(1910) p. 4836, would seem clearly to show that the legislature intended to grant the right
of set-off in actions brought by municipal corporations, and not merely to give separate judgments to the contestants. Georges Township v. Union Trust Co., supra note i, reached a
result contrary to the decision of the instant case without the aid of such statute. The
majority's analogy of the principal case to Lyon v. City of Elizabeth, 43 N. J.L. 158
(I88I), is not well taken; the bank is not here attempting to levy on municipal property
under execution-it is merely requesting a set-off of one chose in action against another
before judgment is rendered.
I The delay entailed in the mandamus procedure to which the bank must now resort in
order to collect the municipal debt will manifestly result in temporary illiquidity of this loan.
Nor is it improbable that this delay might cause the bank's failure.
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be sued . . . in any . . . action which might have been brought against . .

decedent if he had lived." 1 In New York, the common law rule that personal
actions abate upon the death of the defendant is applied, unchanged by statute.,
An action was brought in the federal court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania against the executor of an estate in that state for injuries suffered in New
York for which the decedent would have been liable. Held, that since the law
of New York did not provide for a right of action against any but the wrongdoer, no right survived his death. Ormsby v.Chase, U. S. L. W., Dec. 12, 1933,
at 285, rez'g 65 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
It is reassuring to find that, despite the fact that there has been some precedent looking the other way,3 the federal courts henceforth will be bound by the
decision in the instant case to apply the lex loci to the survival of a right of action
which arose in a jurisdiction foreign to that of suit. It seems unquestionable,
as indicated in an earlier issue of this REVIEW, 4 that the granting of such a right
only against the wrongdoer limits the substance of that right; the contrary
result reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals was rightly 5 reversed. In the
comparatively brief opinion deciding the instant case, the Court shows a clear
determination to adhere strictly to a definition of cause of action in terms of
defendant's obligation. Further, it cites and approves two of the three cases
precisely in point,6 and tacitly overrules an earlier holding which is inconsistent
with them. 7 Its action consolidates the extant law respecting survival of actions,
and should aid materially in clarifying concepts basic in the conflict of laws,
notably that of "right".
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-VALIDITY OF
PRIVILEGE TAX ON GASOLINE BASING VARYING RATES ON CLASSIFICATION OF
CITIES AS BORDER CITIES AND OTHERs-An Arkansas statute:' levied a privilege

tax of six cents on each gallon of gasoline sold in the state, except in cities adjoining state lines, in which the rate was to be that provided by law in the adjoining
state. Plaintiffs, gasoline dealers with places of business in the state outside the
limits of the border cities, contested the validity of the tax, alleging that it disin favor of dealers in border cities, where the tax was considerably
criminated
lower,2 and therefore violated the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the
x4th Amendment. Held, that the statute was valid since the lower tax in border
cities was based on a reasonable classification. Bollinger v. Watson, Commissioner of Revenues, 63 S. W. (2d) 642 (Ark. 1933).
The court, reiterating the accepted formula that "equal protection of the
laws" is not denied where a statutory classification which imposes different burdens upon the several classes is reasonable, 3 upheld the challenged legislation
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 20, § 772.
PA.Y.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (19o9) § 120.

-N.

'Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (D. Conn. 1896) (holding that the lex fori governs).
1A more detailed analysis may be found in(1933) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 166.

rIbid.

'Orr v. Ahern, 1O7 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928) ; Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 167
Atl. 315 (1933).
'Whitten v. Bennett, supranote 3.
'ARx.STAT. (1931) Act 63 §I (c), (d).
'InFt. Smith, adjoining Oklahoma, the tax was 40 per gallon; in Texarkana, adjoining
Texas, the tax was 30 per gallon; and in the cities of Blue Eye, Mammoth Spring, and St.
Francis, adjoining Missouri, the tax was only 20 per gallon. See principal case at 643.
'Innumerable decisions apply this doctrine following the leading case of Bell's Gap R.
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct. 533 (I89o). See Giozza v. Tiernan, 148
U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 721 (1893) ; Hart Refineries v. Harman, 278 U. S.499, 49 Sup. Ct.
188 (1929) ; CooLBY, CoNsTITUTIONAL LImITATIONs (7th ed. 1903) 554-575.
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on the theory 4 that a lower tax was justified in border towns in order to remove
the incentive that would otherwise exist for motorists along the border to purchase gasoline in the adjoining state, thereby depriving Arkansas of considerable
revenue. While a tax based on such a classification may be expedient as a means
of increasing the amount of revenue accruing to the state, there would seem
to be ground for doubt as to whether, in view of the inequalities resulting from
its operation both upon motorists and dealers, the classification is reasonable. "
Since the subject matter here taxed is the privilege of using the highways in
motor-driven vehicles, 6 it seems clear that no valid difference justifying varying
tax rates exists between users who happen to buy fuel in border towns and those
who purchase further in the interior, for, irrespective of the place of purchase,
the privilege exercised is in all cases the same.7 Likewise with reference to the
dealer situated in the interior, as were the plaintiffs, this statute would appear
to be discriminatory. Whereas previously to the statute business was diverted
from border dealers to dealers in the adjoining states due solely to the unavoidable difference in tax rates between the states, under the statute the burden
is arbitrarily shifted to the interior dealer and the latter is made to bear the loss
of business from those motorists who now find it cheaper to purchase gas from
nearby border dealers. Although a tax will not be rendered nugatory merely
8
because some inequality is incidentally occasioned by a particular classification,
it may seriously be questioned whether the legislature has the power to remedy
an admittedly existing hardship by causing it to relate to a different group of
persons. 9 The action of the Arkansas court in relying upon recondite principles
of constitutional construction rather than upon a realistic examination of the
°
practical consequences of the contested statute is not helpful.' And even though
a court may properly take into consideration the securing of the effectiveness 11
of a tax as a practical factor making for the reasonableness of variances inevitably
involved in securing it, there must be a point in such a process beyond which it
is the duty of the state to find other means of taxation involving a more equitable
balance of the burden.
' Principal case at 644.
'Reasonableness is determined by the practical effect of the legislation upon the classes
to which it is applied and undue discrimination is not justified by monetary advantage secured
to the state. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U. S. 592, 19 Sup. Ct. 553
(i899) ; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U. S. 79, 2 Sup. Ct. 3o (1901) ; Schoyer
v. Comet Oil & Ref. Co., 284 Pa. 189, 13o Atl. 413 (1925).
6For the purpose of this tax, highway use was to be measured by the amount of gasoline
consumed in motor-driven vehicles; the revenue was to be applied to the building and maintenance of the highway system. Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, I53 Ark. 114, 239 S. W. 753
(1922). But cf. Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 34 N. M. 643, 287 Pac. 699 (193o) where
it was held that this was not a privilege tax for highway use.
' For the same privilege exercised the same tax should prevail. State ex rel. v. Bryan,
87 Fla. 56, 99 So. 327 (924) ; Peninsular Stove Co. v. Burton, 220 Mich. 284, 189 N. W.
88o (1922) ; see Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 382, 158 Pac. 826, 828 (1916).
'Mathematical equality is not required under the 14th Amendment. Petit v. Minnesota,
177 U. S. 764, 20 Sup. Ct. 666 (igoo) ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S.
36, 30 Sup. Ct. 676 (I9IO).
'Although many attempts have been made by legislatures to prevent gasoline tax evasion
and to preserve the revenue within the state, the instant statute is novel in prejudicing one
class for the benefit of another. For a comprehensive survey of gasoline tax statutes see
McAFmE, LEGIsLATIvE SAFEauARs AGAINST GASOLINE EVASION (1931).

10The court, repeating the idiom, among others, of a "presumption in favor of constitutionality", cursorily dismisses the effect of the statute on interior dealers. Principal case at
645. The more progressive judicial policy is to inquire carefully into the practical effect of
the legislation in determining whether there is arbitrary discrimination. See Powell, Supreme
Court Condonations and Condemnations of Discriminatory State Taxation, 1922-1925 (1926)
12 VA. L. REV. 441, 546; Howard, The Supreme Court and State Action Challenged Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1931-1932 (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 5o5, 506-5o8.

"See

JUDSON, TAXATION (2d ed. 1917) § 502.
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CONTRACTS-RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE TO RECOVER MINIMUM WAGE AS THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S RE-EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT-

Plaintiff, an employee of defendant who had signed the President's Re-employment Agreement,' sued to recover the minimum wages specified therein. Held,
that the agreement was a contract made for the benefit of the employee and he
could recover under it as a beneficiary. Beaton z. Avondale, Prentice-Hall Federal Trade and Industry Service, p. 16717, If16721 (Dist. Ct. of Colo., 2d Dist.,
1933).

Any contract found in the Re-employment Agreement must be regarded as2
unilateral since the President's offer to award a badge of honor, the blue eagle,
was capable of acceptance only by an act on the part of, the employer, namely,
compliance with the conditions set forth in the agreement, which as a preliminary
step the employer was required to sign. 4 The filing of the certificate of compliance was but a notification to the President of acceptance by performance.'
But the defendant in the principal case never performed; he merely signed two
papers, ineffective in themselves, since immediate action and not promises was
desired. 6 Therefore no contract can properly be said to have here existed
7
because of failure of the condition stipulated by the president. Even assuming
however, the existence of a valid bilateral contract, there then arises the problem
whether it contemplated a rightof action in the employee. The plaintiff under this
"contract", if he has any right at all, can only be a, donee beneficiary,' and the
existence of his right to recover is doubtful since no intent on the part of the
promisee, the President, to give him a right of action clearly appears.0 An
examination of the cooperative theory behind the N. R. A. and the methods
of enforcement established 10 lead to the belief that the President has intended
' C. C. H., Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service, 1 9201, P. 9225. Authorized by Sec.
4 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 701-712 (1933).
by President Roosevelt, July 24, 1933; N. R. A. Bulletin No. 3, § 7, "... each
Address
b
employer who has signed his agreement and put it into effect may sign the certificate of compliance, take it to his post office, and receive the posters, etc.A which evidence his membership
in the N. R. A."; N. R_ A. Circular No. z, C. C. H., Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service,
p. 9243; N. R. A. Release No. 114, ibid.

(Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 55.
See Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 168 Atl. 862 (N. J. Ch. 1933) (Re-employment Agreement treated as a bilateral contract and employees allowed to sue in equity thereon. Consideration found in the blue eagle, pledge of members of N. R. A. to patronize their
fellow members, and subjection of all competitors to the same burdens).
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 56.
The Re-employment Agreements were merely a stop-gap measure used while the task
of preparing codes for each industry was being carried on.
Without investigation the President's agents complete their part of the arrangement by
issuing the N. R. A. emblem, but when they learn that no contract exists they may reclaim it
by assertion of the government's property right in the emblem, or by an action for breach of
contract. There is the possibility of a criminal action for obtaining property by false pre'CONTRAcTs RESTATEmENT

tenses. See CLARK, CRIMINAL LAw (Mikell's ed. 1915) 362.
CoNTRAcTs RESTATEMENT, sapra note 3, § 133 (I) (a).

Cripple Creek State Bank v. Rollestone, 70 Colo. 434, 202 Pac. 11 (1921) (A third
party is entitled to recover on a contract only if the consideration upon which the right is
claimed was furnished by the promisee with the intent that it secure such benefit to the third
party). N. R. A. Bulletin No. 3, § 12, "There is no force here [in the N. R. A] except conscience and opinion. This is an appeal to those good instincts of our people which have never
been besought in vain."
0 Labor arbitration boards and local compliance boards with the power to hear complaints
by employers and employees have been established by the N. R. A., C. C. H., Inc., Federal
Trade Regulation Service, pp. 9254, 9257, 9263, 9268.

The blue eagle may be with-

drawn. Id. pp. 9275, 9276, ioo96. "Violators of the President's Re-employment Agreement face not only the loss of their Blue Eagle but also, as a result of an executive order issued by President Roosevelt, the same penalties-fines or imprisonment or bothprovided by the National Industrial Recovery Act for violators of permanent codes of fair
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to avoid court action by individuals." A majority of the cases involving similar
agreements in which labor unions are the promisees, deny recovery to an employee
suing on the agreement; 2 only a few allow recovery under the third party
beneficiary theory." The desire to avoid collective action by labor out of court,
is an incentive to the courts to allow recovery in such cases, but this factor is
not present in the principal case.' 4 In contracts made by governmental units to
secure a service to the public which it is under no duty to render, most jurisdictions do not allow members of the public to recover as beneficiaries.'" Although
a minority of jurisdictions supported by competent text-writers favor recovery
in such cases the reasons advanced have no application in the principal case.'" A
number of courts have recently rendered decisions in accord with the principal
case, 7 on the ground that the efforts of the President should not be vitiated by
judicial action. It is misleading, however, to assert that such results have been
reached within the traditional framework of the law. To support these decisions
would seem to require the establishment of a new category 18 to which these
cases might be relegated, or to involve a change of existing contract law no less
revolutionary than the legislation itself.
CORPORATIONS-CREATION OF SHARES-NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT CERTIFICATE BE FILED UPON CREATION OF SHARES
-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE AND OF RATIFICATION BY SHAREHOLD-

competition." Statement by General Johnson, N. R. A. Release No. 1239A, id. p. 9274. The
Act, supra note i, provides in Sec. 3 (f) that the violation of any code provision (and for
certain purposes the Agreement may be referred to as a Blanket Code) shall be a punishable
misdemeanor. Under See. 3 (c) a Federal District Court is empowered to enjoin violations
of the codes and it is made the duty of federal district attorneys tolinstitute suits to enjoin
such violations. Sec. 3 (b) states that proceedings for violations may be brought under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Sec. 4 (b) provides for the licensing of the industries by
the President.
' Need for multiple suits as wages fell due would be burden on employees; fear of loss
of job would prevent employee from starting suit; government sanction of these suits would
cause an employer to refrain from signing the agreement; therefore it seems proper to assume an intentional omission. See statement in N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1933, at 33.
' Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in Anterican Labor Union Working Agreeinents (1933) 9 IND. L. J. 69; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1930)
44 HARV. L. REV. 572; Kessell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 51 F. (2d) 304 (W. D. Wash.
Contra: U. S.
1931) ; Hudson v. Cinn., etc., Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47 (1913)Daily Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 32 F. (2d) 834 (App. D. C. 1929); Hall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S. W. (2d) 687 (1930).
" Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931), and comment in
(1931) 16 MiNN. L. REv. ioo; Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952
(1914) ; Blum v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926).
" 4Note (1931) 18 VA. L. REV. 182, 186.
I Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Salem Water Co., 94 Fed. 238 (C. C. N. D. Ohio
1899) ; Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 16o, 159 N. E. 896 (1928) ; CONTRACTS
§ 373.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 145; WILISTON, CONTRACTS (920)
18It is argued that the citizen is the sole beneficiary; he has no other remedy to recover

his loss except insurance; he has paid a'tax which pays the water company for its service.
Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E. 720 (1899) ; Corbin, Liability of
Water Companiesfor Losses by Fire (191o) ig YALE L. J. 425.
'Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., C. C. H., Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service, 7o67; N. Y. Times. Nov. 2, 1933, at 17 (New York Supreme
Court allowed employee to recover minimum wages as third party beneficiary of Re-employment Agreement) ; Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., supra note 4.
IsIt has been suggested that Labor Union Agreements and Charitable Subscriptions be
treated sui generis. Such peculiar political agreements as this might well be handled in a
similar manner. Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished fron Contracts (1918) 27 YALE
L. J.753; Billig, The Problem of Considerationin CharitableSubscriptions (1927) 12 CORN.
L. Q. 467, 480. Cf. Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided Case (1932) 8, U. OF PA.
L. REv. II5, 128.
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ERs-In July, 1930, directors of corporation voted to create ten shares as to H,

delivered certificates to him, but failed to file a certificate with the Commissioner
of Corporations as required by a statute I providing that no shares should be
lawful unless such certificate were filed within thirty days. At a shareholders'
meeting in October, H was allowed to vote. In February, 1931, the directors,
intending to make certain the validity of H's shares, voted to create ten shares
for him, filed the certificate the next day, but did not issue new share certificates.
Certain shareholders sued to cancel H's shares. Held, that because the corporation lacked power to create H's shares without filing the certificate, and because
essential rights of the corporation and creditors were involved which could not
be waived by the shareholders, 2 the shares should be cancelled. Black v. Taft,
187 N. E. 96 (Mass. 1933).
A dissenting opinion contended that the shares had been validated by the
filing of the certificate in February, and by ratification at the meeting in October.3 The reasoning of the majority opinion as well as its decision displays a
surprisingly reactionary attitude. In stating that the corporation lacked power
to create H's shares, the court purported to apply the doctrine that where a corporation attempts to create shares, having failed to comply with a statutory
requirement, and this failure results in lack of "power" to create them, they are
void for all purposes, and neither subsequent compliance with the statute, nor
waiver, nor ratification can validate them; 4 but where, notwithstanding a noncompliance amounting merely to an "irregularity", the corporation has "power",
then the shares may be validated.' It is by no means settled, however, that "lack
of power" renders shares void for all purposes; 6 and those courts which hold that
it does, limit "lack of power" to cases in which the shares created are either in
excess of the number authorized by the articles of association, or are of a class
'MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 156 § i6.
' Instant case, at 97. On these grounds the court purported to distinguish the instant case
from Mitchell v. Mitchell, 263 Mass. i6o, i6o N. E. 539 (928) in which the plaintiff sued
to cancel shares created in exchange for other shares, contrary to statute and the articles of
association which authorized their creation for cash only. The court held that the purpose
of the statute was to protect shareholders and creditors against the creation of shares for less
than their par value, found that the shares given as payment were worth as much as the par
value of those created for the plaintiff, and refused to cancel the shares. It is difficult to see
wherein this case is distinguishable from the instant case, either as to "power" to create
shares, or as to the existence of essential rights ot, creditors and the corporation which may
be affected by the failure to comply with the statute in question.
' Instant case, at 98. The dissenting opinion cited Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra note 2, to
support its contention that the shares should not be cancelled. The principle underlying the
Mitchell decision appears to be that shares should not be cancelled if the purpose of the statute which has not been complied with has been satisfied. Applying this principle to the instant case, we reach, as we shall later see, the result contended for by the dissenting justice.
' Scovill v. Thayer, o5 U. S. 143 (i88i) ; Heide v. Capital Securities Co., 200 Ala. 397,
76 So. 313 (97).
Michaels v. Pac. Laundry, io4 Cal. App. 349, 286 Pac. i65 (i93o) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell,
supra note 2.
0
BusiNEss ASSOCIATIONS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) Tentative Draft No. I,
states that a corporation has "power" when some agreement between the corporation and
some person would immediately create the shares as to such person (§ 2) ; that when a corporation attempts to create shares without "power" to do so, the shares may be validated by
subsequent acquisition of "power" (§ 29) or by ratification (§ io) ; but that the shares may
not be ratified only when the original transaction has resulted in no legal consequences whatsoever (§ io, Comment). Under this view, the corporation in the instant case might be said
to lack "power" to create shares without filing a certificate, but it cannot be said that such
a transaction could not be ratified, without assuming that it has resulted in no legal consequences whatsoever, which is the very question to be decided.
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other than those authorized.7

Since, in the principal case, H's shares were

neither in excess of the number authorized, nor of a class other than those
authorized by the articles, they were not, under any view as to the effect of "lack
of power", void for all purposes. More significant than this difference in application of the concept of "lack of power", however, is the fact that most courts
reach their decisions by inquiring into the purposes of the statute which has not
been complied with, and then use the term, "power", or "lack of power", to describe the result thus reached." The purposes of the statute in the instant case
appear to be (I) to furnish prospective creditors with a basis for estimating the
credit-worthiness of the corporation,9 and (2) to protect shareholders against
loss resulting from the creation of new shares for less than market value, by
giving publicity to the amount and kind of consideration received for the new
shares.'
To creditors, however, cancellation of H's shares would prove harmful, rather than beneficial, because if the record is at all resorted to, since the
filing of the certificate in February they might well have relied on the capital
represented by the record of his shares. So, too, for the protection of the shareholders, cancellation was unnecessary. The certificate having been filed, the
consideration given by H for his shares was put on public record, thus making
any deficiency apparent. Moreover, the shareholders, by recognizing H at the
October meeting, knowing then of the non-compliance with the statute, waived
any injury to their own interests, and this, in itself, should have been sufficient
to validate the shares.

CORPORATIoNs-REcEIVERs--RIGHT OF RECEIVERh TO ENFORCE LIABILITY
OF DIRECTORS UNDER A STATUTE GIVING RIGHT OF ACTION TO CORPORATION

AND ITS CREDiTORs-Receiver of an insolvent Delaware corporation sued directors in Minnesota for the amount of dividends declared by them in violation of a
Delaware statute providing for liability in such a case "to the corporation and
'Shares were held void, due to lack of "power", in Scovill v. Thayer, supra note 4 (in
which the shares in question were in excess of the number authorized by the articles of association, i. e., they were an "over-issue") ; Pruitt v. Okla. Baking Co., 39 Okla. 509, 135 Pac.
730 (1913) (which also involved an "over-issue" of shares). Shares were held to be not
void, "abstract power" having been present, in Palmer v. Bank, 72 Minn. 266, 75 N. W. 380
(1898) (in which a certificate, filed to authorize the creation of the shares in question, had
been improperly signed and acknowledged) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra note 2.
' Michaels v. Pac. Laundry, supra note 5 (in which shares, created without having been
first offered to the old shareholders, as required by statute, were held to have been validated
by subsequent approval of the shareholders). Even in cases of "over-issue" some courts
have found that the corporation had "power" to create the shares, when it appeared that the
articles of association had been subsequently amended to authorize the creation of the shares:
In Re Rombach & Co., 9 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) ; Zobrist v. Estes, 65 Ore. 573, 133
Pac. 644 (1913).
" The statute (supra note i) requires that the certificate shall contain a description of
the share structure of the corporation, of the shares already created and those not yet created,
and of the consideration received or to be received for shares already created and which are
about to be created.
10Few cases discuss the purposes of such a statute. Spena v. Goffe, 112 Kan. 693, 212
Pac. 1093 (1923) held that such a statute is intended to protect shareholders against the creation of shares for insufficient consideration. The required contents of the certificate (szupra
note 9) suggest that the legislative intent is to benefit creditors and shareholders in the manner indicated, especially in view of the many cases which uphold the rights of creditors and
shareholders in connection with other, but similar, non-compliances with law. Handley v.
Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 (1891) ; Palmer v. Bank, supra note 7 (both cases allowing creditors to
recover from shareholders of insolvent corporation unpaid balances on the agreed price for
their shares); Spena v. Goffe, supra; Lee v. Cameron, 67 Okla. 8o, 169 Pac. 17 (1917)
(both allowing shareholders to secure cancellation of shares for which there had been received insufficient consideration).
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its creditors",' but indicating no procedure for enforcement of the liability.
Held, that the Delaware statute governed, and that the receiver was unauthorized
in the absence of statutory authority to collect assets belonging exclusively to
the creditors. Rockwood v. Foshay, 66 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
The premise adopted by the court is its interpretation of a Delaware decision
on the statute in question 2 as indicating that the Delaware court considered the
statute as vesting the right of recovery exclusively in the creditors. 3 The theory
read into the latter opinion is to the effect that the liability of the directors is,
after insolvency, not an asset of the corporation, but is a collateral obligation
for the benefit of creditors. This is in the nature of a surety to them for the
corporate debts and does not pass as part of the equitable interests of the corporation to the receiver. 4 But the language of the Roeblings case I could also be the
basis for an argument which would lead to a result contrary to that of the instant
court. Many courts regard the property of an insolvent corporation as a trust
fund for the benefit of creditors. The secondary liability created by the statute
is, likewise, for the benefit of creditors and is also considered as a trust fund for
the purpose of satisfying their claims. Since both are trust funds for a single
purpose, though derived from different sources, there is no sound reason why
they should not be administered by the same person, namely, the receiver.6 Even
if the trust fund rationale is to be rejected 7 it would seem that where the purpose
of the statute is to provide a substitutional liability to replace the assets dispersed
by the director's unlawful dividend," the same person in charge of collecting
corporate assets should be permitted to enforce the liability intended to replace

IGEN. CORP. LAw OF DEz_. (1927) § 1949. "In case of any wilful or negligent violation
of the provisions of this Section, the Directors under whose administration the same may
happen shall be jointly and severally liable, in an action on the case, at any time within six
years after paying such unlawful dividend, to the corporation and its creditors, or any of
them, in the event of its dissolution or insolvency, to the full amount of the dividend so unlawfully paid. .. ."
-Roeblings Sons Co. v. Mode, i Pennewill 515, 43 AtI. 48o (Del. 1899).
' See instant case at 628. The exact holding of the Delaware case, however, was not to
the effect that the right of recovery was exclusively in the creditors, but was simply a denial
of the right of a single creditor to recover from the directors.
'Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244 (19o3) ; Jacobson v. Allen, 12 Fed.
454 (S. D. N. Y. 1882); Zang v. Wyant, 25 Colo. 551, 56 Pac. 565 (1898); Hammond v.
Cline, 170 Ind. 452, 84 N. E. 827 (igog) ; Colton v. Mayer, go Md. 71i, 45 Atl. 874 (igoo) ;
Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. Bank, 66 Minn. 441, 69 N. W. 331 (i8g6); Butterworth v.
O'Brien, 39 Barb. Ch. 192 (N. Y. 1863) ; Fordham v. Poor, iog Misc. 187, 179 N. Y. Supp.
367 (Ig1g) ; MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 869.
r Supra note 2, at 520, 523, 43 Atl. at 481, 482, where the court speaks of the statute as
contemplating restoration to the capital stock of the amount illegally withdrawn as a part of
the common fund, which, in the case of dissolution or insolvency, is devoted to the liquidation
of the indebtedness of the corporation. But the court also adds that "the director's liability
is to the corporation first, but, if it be dissolved or insolvent, then to the creditors."
IKirtley v. Holmes, 107 Fed. I (C. C. A. 6th, igoi) ; Good v. Derr, 46 F. (2d) 411
(C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Austin v. Garard, 61 F. (2d) I29 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Luikhart v.
Spurck, i F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Ill. 1932) ; State v. Bank, 1O3 Iowa 549, 72 N. W. 1076 (1897) ;
Hovarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 56 N. E. 888 (igoo); Brownell v. Adams, 11 Neb.
304, 236 N. W. 750 (1931) ;Smathers v. Bank, 135 N. C. 410, 47 S. E. 893 (19o4) ; Zieverink
v. Kemper, 5o Ohio St. 208, 34 N. E. 250 (1893) ; Wilson v. Book, 13 Wash. 676, 43 Pac.
939 (i896) ; see Sheafe v. Larimer, 79 Fed. 921, 925 (N. D. Iowa 1897). These cases support the proposition that the receiver should administer both trust funds for the benefit of the
creditors where the statutory double liability of stockholders is involved.
"Hunt, Trust Fuind Theory and Some Substitutes for It (19o2) 12 YALE L. J. 63; see
also Bonbright, Shareholder'sDefenses Against Liability (1925) 25 Co. L. REV. 408, 412.
In these articles the trust fund theory is rejected as legally unsound since principles of the
law of trusts cannot be applied in their entirety.
8This is the description of the purpose of the statute advanced in Roeblings Sons Co. v.
Mode, supra note s. To the same effect see Cochran v. Shetler, 286 Pa. 226, 231, 133 Atl.
232, 234 (1926).
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them. In support of such a view 9 are its speed, economy, and practicality, all of
which the instant court admits.' 0 It may be noted that the same desirable
result has been reached by holding that the receiver so far represents the creditors
that it is his duty to enforce this statutory liability."-

CORPOATIONS-SERvICE ON FOREIGN CORPORATION-VALIDITY AGAINST
SURETY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST FOREIGN CORPORATION BASED ON PROCESS
SERVED ON STATUTORY AGENT AFTER DISSOLUTION OF THE CORPORATION-A

New York insurance company, in qualifying to do business in Louisiana, designated the Secretary of State its agent to receive process. Subsequently, a New
York court exercised its statutory power to dissolve the corporation. Thereafter, plaintiff brought action in Louisiana against the corporation, by service
on the Secretary of State. The present action is to enforce the judgment so
obtained, against a surety. Held, that the judgment was a nullity because process
upon which it was based was served when the defendant was civiliter ntortitus.
National Surety Co. v. Cobb, 66 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
The plaintiff argued that "regardless of the effect upon the life of the company in New York, of its dissolution there, the designation by it of an agent in
Louisiana for the purposes of suit ' made it continuously amenable to suit
there . . and that neither the withdrawal from the state nor the dissolution
in its own state, affected the designation". It is true that withdrawal from the
state, even if accompanied by an express revocation of the designation of agents
to receive process, is ineffective to deny jurisdiction,2 for the reason that "the
statutory remedy against foreign corporations would be illusory if the corporation
were at liberty to incur heavy obligations in the state and then to retire with
impunity".3
But when the corporation is dissolved, the jurisdictional objection
is more than an argument that the defendant has been improperly served because
of the termination of the "agency" of the secretary of state.4 It is that the

'It is submitted that the reasons for allowing the receiver to recover corporate assets
should extend to the collection of the statutory liability. See Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 2o3,
:22 (U. S. 1872) ; Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed. 747, 765 (C. C. A. Ist, 1899) where the rule of
convenience in allowing a receiver to represent creditors in enforcing statutory liability was
strongly advanced. It may be noted that there is an increasing tendency to provide statutory
authority for the receiver's enforcement of such liability. 7 ToamPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d
ed. 1927) § 5179. See Mnmx. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8025; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926)
§ 2249.
" See instant case at 63o.
' Cushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. 66, 34 At. 447 (1896) ; Cochran v. Shetler, supra note 8;
see Hodde v. Nobbe, 204 Mo. App. 1O9, 123, 221 S. W. 130, 134 (192o) ; cf. Childs v. Adams,
43 Pa. Super. 239 (19io).
' For a compilation of the ubiquitous statutes requiring this step in the domestication of
foreign corporations, and cases thereunder, see 2 CoucH, CYcLOPEDIA OF INSURANcE LAW
(1929) § 553. See also Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1925) 24 MIcE. L.
REv. 633; Note (929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. IO1O.
2Woodward v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. io (19o4) ; Moore
v. Mutual Life Ass'n, 129 N. C. 31, 39 S. E. 637 (19Ol) ; Groel v. United Elec. Co., 69
N. J. Eq. 397, 6o Atl. 822 (19o5) ; 7 CooiEv, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 6881,
6892; CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) Proposed Final Draft No. I,
§§ 98, 99. But cf. Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573, 31 Sup. Ct. 127
(910), 30 L. R. A. (N. s.) 686 (i9ii).
Note (1929)

77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1010, 1014.

4 It should be observed that the effect of the statutes authorizing this form of service cannot be determined on principles of common law agency. They set up a legal device or technique for suing foreign corporations, the limitations of which must be sought in the statutes
themselves and in the constitutional guarantee of due process. See (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L.
REV. 469.
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dissolution of a corporation, like the death of an individual, precludes the possibility of its being a defendant.5 This objection has uniformly been sustained,
when no statutory provision "prolongs the life" of the dissolved corporation for
the purpose of suit.' It is based in reason on the interference with the orderly
process of liquidation which would result from permitting judgments to be
obtained after the dissolution of corporate defendants. 7 The policy of noninterference with the liquidation of a dissolved principal is inapplicable where,
as in the instant case, the action is against a solvent surety, whose very presence
in the transaction was to meet the contingency of default by the principal. But
since the theory of the plaintiff's action is a valid judgment against the principal,
a demonstration of the nullity of the judgment would seem to be a complete
answer to the claim based on it.s

DURESS-STOCK MARKET DECLINE AND BUSINESS DISTRESS AS FACTORS
IN DETERMINING WHETHER PAYMENT OF WRONGFUL CHARGE TO GAIN PosSESSION OF STOCKS WAS INVOLUNTARY-Defendant stock-brokers wrongfully I

charged $15,ooo against plaintiff's account, which made his margin with them
insufficient.

Despite plaintiff's protests, they sold half his collateral stock.

For

the alleged purpose of getting back the balance of his stock, plaintiff paid the
overcharge under protest. All these transactions occurred in the fall of 1929.
In an action to recover the $I5,ooo and damages from the wrongful sale, plaintiff
was nonsuited. Held, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury that the
payment was under duress, in view of the sharply dropping stock market and
of the widespread business distress and consequent possibility of the barrenness
of a money judgment against the stock-brokers. Miller v. Eisele, 168 Atl. 426

(N. J. 1933).
It is well settled that a voluntary payment of a wrongful demand cannot
be recovered, unless made under mistake or without knowledge of the facts.'

'The use of the metaphor "death" to describe the dissolution of a corporation, common
as it is, is likely to make the conclusion that it cannot be sued seem too self-evident. Were
it desirable to reach another conclusion, it might well be argued that permission to do business
in a foreign state creates a "new fictitious personality drawing the breath of life exclusively"
from the state granting the permission. See HoHFMLD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEIONS
(1923) 278 et seq. A foreign dissolution decree might not extinguish, for all purposes, this
new "legal entity". See Life Ass'n v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315, 325 (1882).
'Marion Phosphate Co. v. Perry, 74 Fed. 425 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896) ; United States Truck
Co. v. Pennsylvania Surety Co., 259 Mich. 422, 243 N. W. 311 (1932); Burns v. Niagara
Life Ins. Co., 279 Pa. 453, 124 Atl. 128 (1924). But cf. The Fair v. American Union Fire
Ins. Co., 135 La. 48, 64 So. 977 (1914) (allowed recovery against surety oft judgment against
the principal, but not clear whether the proceedings in Pennsylvania which antedated the
service were actual dissolution or some form of insolvency receivership). Washington ex rel.
etc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624 (933), apparently contra, though the
dissolution point is not argued, is explained by reference to the same case in the lower court,
169 Wash. 688, 15 P. (2d) 66o (1932), where it appears that the corporation dissolved
under the laws of Delaware was, by the Delaware statute, continued for three years after
dissolution for the purpose of defending actions.
7
The proper procedure is to sue the statutory liquidator or receiver of the corporation's
assets. See Rodgers v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 38, 42 N. E. 515, 516 (1895).
' It is well settled that a surety may take advantage of the fact that the court which gave
judgment against the principal had no jurisdiction. City of Fall River v. Riley, 140 Mass.
488, 5 N. E. 481 (1886).
IWhether the charge was actually wrongful was in dispute, the case proceeding, of
course, on the possibility that the jury would so find.
2 Shell Oil Co. v. Cy Miller, Inc., 53 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ; Whitall-Tatum
Co. v. Borough of Vineland, 1O2 N. J. L. 28, 131 Atl. 65 (1925); Burne v. Van Raalte Co.,
202 App. Div. 189, 195 N. Y. Supp. 6oi (1922).
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Where, however, property has been wrongfully withheld from its owner unless
he pay a wrongful demand, such payment is considered involuntary, or under
duress, and may be recovered.3 The reason is that an owner will not be obliged
to incur loss or injury to his property, if this is the only alternative to payment.
Accordingly, it has been stated as a rule that if the alternative of an immediate
and adequate remedy at law existed, payment to recover property cannot have
been involuntary. 4 The scarcity of cases covering such a situation in which a
remedy has been held adequate I and the fact that an action for damages has
never been held adequate 6 suggests that the effect of this perfunctorily repeated
qualification is almost nugatory.7 On principle, there is little reason why an
owner should be forced to assume the burden of a lawsuit as an alternative to
suffering the risk that his payment to recover wrongfully withheld property may
be held voluntary. To reach the clearly correct result, the instant court, troubled
by the language as to "adequacy" of relief, indulged in a novel line of reasoning.
It is an unprecedented argument that the mere possibility of business depression
rendering a money judgment against the stock-brokers a barren remedy should
be a factor in determining whether plaintiff was compelled against his will to
make payment. Since an earlier New Jersey case expressly denied the defense
of adequacy of remedy where property was withheld under a wrongful claim of
lien,$ it is doubtful how far the instant case has created new law on duress. Yet
in looking beyond a money judgment to its actual value, the instant court showed
a commendable tendency to depart from the tradition of our legal system never
to inquire past the culmination of its procedural action for affording relief.

EVIDENcE-HEARSAY
MAY BE MADE IN FAVOR OF

RULE-CONDITIONS UNDER WHIcH EXCEPTION
DYING DECLARATION-In the prosecution of appel-

lant for murder, there was put in evidence a declaration by the victim that
appellant was her murderer. As a foundation for this admission, the prosecution
proved that at the time of her statement, the victim had said that she was "going
to die", that she "would not get well". Held, that the admission of the declaration was error, since the foundation was insufficient in that it did not show that
deceased, when she made the statement, believed that death was impending.
Shepard v. U. S., 54 Sup. Ct.

22

(1933).

'Berger v. Bonnell Motor Car Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 589, 133 Atl. 778 (1926) ; Scholey v.
Mumford, 6o N. Y. 498 (1875); Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 9,5 (Eng. 1732). Note, ANN.
CAs. 1913A, 1354-56.
See McTigue v. Arctic Ice Cream Supply Co., 2o Cal. App. 708, 718, 130 Pac. 165, 169
(1912); De Graff v. Board of County Commissioners, 46 Minn. 319, 320, 48 N. W. 1135
(i8g) ; Cadwell v. Higginbotham, 2o N. M. 482, 512, 151 Pac. 315, 323 (915).
'Turner v. Barber, 66 N. J. L. 496, 49 Atl. 676 (ioi) (in which plaintiff to regain
his property need only have posted a bond which the court specifically found be could have
afforded) ; Karschner v. Latimer, lO8 Neb. 32, 187 N. W. 83 (1922); cf. Boss v. Hutchinson, 182 App. Div. 88, 169 N. Y. Supp. 513 (1918) (title to property held not to have passed

to plaintiff; adequate remedy in action for breach of contract of sale).
The point has seldom been pressed before an appellate court, and it has always been
rejected. Carhill Pet. Co. v. Ennis-Bayard Pet. Co., 81 Pa. Super. 486 (1923) ; Lowenstein
v. Bache, 41 Pa. Super. 552 (191o); Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. & C. 73 (Eng. 1827); Astley
v. Reynolds, supra note 3.
'It is obvious that "adequacy of remedy", employed by courts in this situation, has a
radically different connotation when used by equity courts as a ground for declining jurisdiction.
' Berger v. Bonnell Motor Car Co., supra note 3, the opinion of which the instant court
cited in toto, apparently with approval.
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It is a matter for regret that the court in this case was not willing to lend
its authority to a growing tendency I to modify rigid requirements under the
hearsay rule in respect to dying declarations. 2 For centuries4 3 these statements
have been admitted in trials for the murder of the declarant, primarily because
of the dearth of better evidence.; Rationalization of this stand has been found
of going to
in the formula that the awesome presence of death, the prospect
6
That much is
meet one's Maker, remove all ground for suspecting falsehood.
settled law; 7 but the further question arises: how nearly dead must the declarant
have believed himself to be in order that this guarantee may operate? Answers
devised by the courts range from an insistence that the declaration issue almost
with the last breath 8 to a requirement that the declarant be shown simply to have
relinquished all hope of recovery. 9 The decision in the instant case leans far
toward the first view; l the second seems much more reasonable. Whatever
guarantee there is of truthfulness is purely psychological, arising from the contemplation of inevitable abandonment of this world as a result of present illness;
it is the certainty of demise rather than its immediacy which removes the motives
for falsehood. This decision glosses over the real reason for weighing the
evidence; still more dubious is its reliance upon collateral matters, which are
given undue weight.11 An expression of hope voiced two weeks after this
declaration,' 2 the optimism of some (not all) of the attending physicians 13.__
apparently not communicated to the patient-and an unsupported supposition that
the deceased was on the road to recovery are given unwarranted prominence in
weighing her statement. In order to determine the evidentiary value of that
statement, we must look chiefly to the declarant's state of mind at the time when
ITwo phenomena justify this analysis of the recent trend of the law: the removal of
the indefensible bar to admission of dying declarations in civil actions, infra note 4, and the
recognition of the non-religiou$ sature of the sanction guaranteeing a death-bed statement,
infra note 6.
' It is interesting to note that European courts receive and weigh hearsay evidence without argument. Ireton, Hearsay Evidence in Europe (1932) 66 U. S. L. REV. 252.
a3 WIGMORF, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 1430, 1431, and cases cited.
' By an illogical rule of law, admission was formerly granted only in certain criminal
cases. Lately a healthy tendency to abolish this unnecessary distinction has appeared.
Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625, 5o L. R. A. (N. s.) 1167 (1914) ; N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 16o; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 9-226; McCarty v. Sirianni, 132 Ore.
It seems incontrovertible that if dying declarations are evidence
290, 285 Pac. 825 (193o).
at all, they are so in every case. Ryan, Dying Declarationsin Civil Actions (193o) IO B. U.
L. REV. 470.
0 3 WnmsORE, loc. cit. supra note 3.
A nice question is presented when we consider the dying declarations of a person who
denies the existence of a future state-in view of modern scepticism, a serious possibility. In
the few cases decided, the holding has been that the solemnity of, the occasion and circumstances is sufficient guarantee. Wright v. State, 135 So. 636 (Ala. App. 1931) ; see Nesbit v.
State, 43 Ga. 238 ( 187 1 ) ; State v. Yee Gueng, 57 Ore. 509, 112 Pac. 424 (1910).
'The authorities are collected at length in Note (1902) 56 L. R. A. 353, 365.
' People v. Selknes, 309 Ill. 113, 14o N. E. 852 (1923) ; People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y. 494,
96 N. E. 355 (91).
IFreels v. State, 13o Ark. 189, 196 S. W. 913 (1917) ; State v. Smith, 1O3 Kan. 148,
174 Pac. 551 (1918) ; State v. Sullivan, 2o R. I. 114, 37 Atl. 673 (1897).
hope of
'o "To make out a dying declaration, the declarant must have spoken without
recovery and in the shadow of impending death." Principal case at 23. The court indicates
rather clearly its allegiance to the rigid rule of exclusion.
' For sound reasons given in the decisions, these facts are usually held to be wholly
impertinent. See infra notes 12, 13.
1 Calico v. Commonwealth, 2o6 Ky. 271, 267 S. W. 167 (1924) ; State v. Schaffer, 23
Ore. 555, 32 Pac. 545 (1893).
"People v. Stacy, 119 App. Div. 743, 1O4 N. Y. Supp. 615 (1907) ; Commonwealth v.
Latampa, 226 Pa. 23, 74 At. 736 (19o9).
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the declarationwas made.14 Under the facts of this case, application of a less
rigid rule would seem to have admitted the declaration to consideration. Concededly, its admission would tend to enlarge an exception to the hearsay rule;
but that is no cause for alarm. Among the many exceptions now recognized,
that made constantly in favor of declarations of design or plan 15 admits as
evidence statements made with much less sanction than a dying declaration possesses. Since in reason we must look to other exceptions to determine how far
we may revise an ancient rule of evidence, wide recognition of such an exception
must be persuasive authority for further liberalization along other lines. The
need for reconciling and co-ordinating our rules of evidence would have been
better served had the court aligned itself with modern thought by treating the
dying declaration more liberally.

INCOME TAX-CONSOLIDATED RETURNS OF AFFILIATED CORPORATIONSALLOWANCE FOR PREvious LOSSES OF SUBSIDIARY IN COMPUTATION OF Loss
TO PARENT CAUSED BY LIQUIDATION OF SUBSIDIARY-Parent corporation owned

controlling stock interest in subsidiary corporation.

From the inception of

affiliation the subsidiary had sustained losses which had been deducted in consolidated income tax returns of the affiliated companies.' The subsidiary was
then liquidated. The parent company claimed as deductible the loss sustained
on the liquidation, notwithstanding the previous deductions allowed for subsidiary's losses in the consolidated returns. (I) Held, that the loss on liquidation was wholly deductible. McLaughlin v. Pacific Lumber Co., 66 F. (2d)
895 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).

(2) Held, that the loss was not deductible because

of the previous deductions in consolidated returns. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Apartment Corporation,67 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1933).
The reason for the present conflict is found in the history of the decisions
in this field. Since the purpose of Congress in allowing consolidated returns
was to eliminate the use of intercompany adjustments of profits and losses to
evade taxation,2 the early decisions held that no taxable gain or deductible loss
resulted from a dissolution of the subsidiary by liquidation or by sale of its
stock.3 The theory of these decisions was that since the affiliated group was to
:P"eople v. Cord, 157 Cal. 562, ioS Pac. 511 (191o) ; People v. Falletto, supra note 8.
53 WIGMoRF. EviDENcE § 1725, and cases cited.
'The Revenue Act of 1918 was the first to provide for consolidated income tax returns
for affiliated corporations. 40 STAT. 1081, I02 (1919). It provided that corporations which
were affiliated within the meaning of the Act must make their income tax returns on the basis
of the consolidated net income of the affiliated group. Corporations were declared affiliated
by the Act when one owned or controlled all the stock of the other, or where substantially
all of the stock of both was controlled by the same interests.
2 See U. S. TREAs. REG. 62, Art. 635 (1922).
The purpose of consolidated returns was
to eliminate tax evasions between affiliated corporations by interadjustments of profits and
losses. For example, where in the case of two corporations controlled by the same stockholders one suffered a loss while the other showed a profit, the tax on this profit could be
evaded by means of a transfer of assets from the profit-making unit to the losing unit in
exchange for a nominal consideration. The result would be no taxable gain being shown by
either. The statute was designed to prohibit this type of transaction. But on the whole
corporations profited by the practice of filing consolidated returns. There was now no need
for the intercompany adjustment since losses and profits of various units could be balanced
against each other. The only disadvantage to corporations under consolidated returns was
in the matter of exemptions, the Act allowing only one for the entire group. Since greater
revenue was not forthcoming, later Revenue Acts made consolidated returns optional but
with wide powers in the Commissioner to make tax regulations. See 45 STAT. 831 (1928),
26 U. S. C. A. §2141 (928).

'Appeal of Farmers Deposit National Bank, 5 B. T. A. 520 (1926) ; Appeal of Crocker,
5 B. T. A. 537 (1926).

RECENT CASES

be treated as a single unit, the sale by the parent of the subsidiary's stock was
really a sale by a taxpayer of its own capital stock, and thus could not result in
loss or gain. This reasoning resulted from a misapprehension of the fact that
the consolidated return was merely a procedural device for taxation purposes
and not a substantive change in corporate structure, the status of the members
of the affiliated group as separate corporate entities remaining unchanged by it.
Later courts, realizing that the surrender by a parent corporation of its holdings
in a subsidiary corporatiorn could result in actual gain or loss to the parent since
the two were distinct units, held the opposite view. 4 But, once having attained
their objective of classifying these transactions as taxable, these courts went to
the opposite extreme of taxing the profit or loss on liquidation without regard
to previous profits or losses of the subsidiary which had figured in consolidated
tax returns of other years. This defect was remedied by later decisions,5 notably
in the recent case of Burnet v. Aluminum Co.6 in which the Supreme Court
realistically held that a loss to the parent company occasioned by liquidation of
its subsidiary was deductible, subject, however, to previous deductions taken in
consolidated returns. Both instant opinions relied on this decision, although
clearly it supports only the Apartment Corp. case.7 The court in the Pacific
Lumber Co. case was apparently misled by the ruling in the Aluminum Co. case
that the liquidation of a subsidiary could result in deductible loss to the parent.
As were the courts in earlier cases mentioned, it was impressed with the fact
that it was now unhampered by any restriction against taxability of this type of
transaction, and thus proceeded to allow the entire loss to be deducted, without
regard to previous deductions. It lost sight of the true doctrine of the Aluminum
Co. case, that the true loss or gain to the parent company on its original investment could be ascertained only by consideration of the losses and profits made
during the period of affiliation as well as those sustained at the termination of
the affiliation. The court in the instant Apartment Co. case kept this doctrine
well in mind in arriving at its result," and renders the most satisfactory basis for
realistically adjusting the procedure to fit the obvious intention of the framers
of the statute.
MORTGAGES-EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION-GRANT OF Two SEPARATE
MORTGAGES ON ADJOINING BUILDINGS BY COMMON OWNER, AS CREATING EASEMENT BY ImPLIcATION-H, common owner of the adjacent X and Y buildings,
had in 1919 removed a stairway in Y building, and occupants' only means of
access to third floor was by a stairway in X building and through a doorway
cut in the partition wall on the third floor. Later H simultaneously executed
separate first mortgages' on each building to bank. In 1929 H discharged the

'Remington Rand Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ; United
Publishers' Corporation v. Anderson, 42 F. (2d) 781 (S. D. N. Y. 193o).
r Burnet v. Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Co., 287 U. S. 544, 53 Sup. Ct. 227 (1933)
Burnet v. Riggs National Bank, 57 F. (2d) 98o (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).

' Supra note 5.
7"As respondent's total loss in 1917 was reduced, before deduction in the consolidated
return, by the amount of the operating loss of the [subsidiary] for that year, there was no
duplication of any losses accrued or sustained in that year." Burnet v. Aluminum Co., 288
This language clearly indicates that the
U. S. 544, 550-551, 53 Sup. Ct. 227, 230 (933).
court allowed the loss on liquidation to be deducted only when allowances were made for
previous deductions taken for operating losses of the subsidiary.
' No deductions were allowed here since the sum of the deductions allowed in previous
consolidated returns for subsidiary's losses exceeded the loss now claimed on liquidation.
IMassachusetts is among a minority in holding that a mortgage on realty conveys title
in ,fee which continues in the mortgagee until the condition subsequent of payment is fulfilled.
Murphy v. Welch, 128 Mass. 489 (88o) ; I Jo NEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 40, 59.
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mortgage on the X property and deeded the property to plaintiff. In 1931 bank
foreclosed on the Y property and deeded it to defendant. Plaintiff sought to
enjoin defendant and its tenants from using the stairway in the X building.
Held, that at the time of execution of the separate mortgages by H, there was
created by implication an easement appurtenant to defendant's land over plaintiff's stairway to third floor, and that it would continue for the joint life of the
buildings. Mt. Holyoke Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Really Corp. et al., 187 N. E.
227 (Mass. 1933).

In addition to the usual types of easement created by express grant or
reservation, and by prescription, easements are often held to arise by implied
grant. The latter may be created upon the severance of ownership of land
where the owner has used the portion which he retains for the benefit of another
portion, or vice versa.2 The basis upon which such easements are implied is
that the parties, taken to have known the facts, must have intended at the time
of the severance I that the existing use of the quasi-servient land should continue.4 Courts have set more or less definite rules as aids with which to determine whether such easements have been intended.5 The principal opinion pays
close attention to the finding of an apparent intent 6 but seems unsuccessful in
establishing the fact that there has been the severance of ownership traditionally
essential to the creation of an implied easement.7 The grant of two separate
mortgages, which in Massachusetts convey defeasible fee-simple titles,8 is declared by the court to be a sufficient severance in spite of the fact that the legal
title to both parcels of land was at the same time conveyed to the same mortgagee
and the equity of redemption left in the same mortgagor. At most there was
only a possibility of severance, i. e., by foreclosure on one property and not on
the other.' However, an easement could not be implied upon foreclosure, since
in title-mortgage jurisdictions foreclosure merely divests the mortgagor of his
equity of redemption, title already being in the mortgagee. Likewise, the easement could not be created by the mortgagor after the grant of the mortgage
' Such easements do not arise until severance because of the concept that one cannot have
an easement against himself, his right of way over the land being based on his ownership.
During unity of title the use is termed a quasi-easement. z TIFFANY, THE LAW oF REAL
PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) 1272. Another type of easement by implication is the easement of

necessity. Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 7&N. J. Eq. 434, 79 Atl. 326

(1911) ; Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286, 234 N. W. 904 (i93i); see Hawkes v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 346, 351, 352, lO7 Atl. 747, 749 (1919).
'In this manner both the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule are followed.
Opin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 529, 12o N. E. 183 (1918) ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2,
1271.

'Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 241 Mass. 417, 136 N. E. 813 (1922) ; Ciski v. Went122 Ohio St. 487, 172 N. E. 276 (193o); Greek v. Wylie, 266 Pa. 18, iog Atl. 529
(192o) ; Kusiak v. Ucci, 163 Atl. 226 (R. I. 1932) ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, 1273.
For example, it is a requirement that the user by the common owner be apparent, continuous and reasonably necessary. Whiting v. Gaylord, 66 Conn. 337, 34 At]. 85 (1895);
Powers v. Heffernan, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N. E. 661 (19o8) ; Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88,
30 Atl. lO94 (1894) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178 (1864).
Some of the factors tending to show this intent are mentioned by the court on page 230.
They are: (I) the dominant tenement was mortgaged at a greater value; (2) the fact that
the common owner retained use of both and would want privileges to continue; (3) the possibility that only one of the mortgages might be foreclosed and an easement would assure continuation of right of passage; (4) the knowledge by both parties of the method of access to
the premises at the time of making mortgages.
'See cases supra note 4.
' Supra note I.
'The same condition would exist if there were only a single mortgage on both properties
since a foreclosure might result in the sale of only one or the sale of both to different persons. Thus the court's emphasis on the fact of separate mortgages seems unwarranted.

worth,
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because he has no power in any way to diminish the estate of the mortgagee. 10
The court is thus forced, in its eagerness to find an easement, to declare that it
was created at the time the mortgages were made. Though the result reached
may be desirable, based as it is on what amounts to a severance of titles, it is not
in accordance with the true requirement-a severance of persons." In lienmortgage jurisdictions it would seem impossible to attain the same result as in
the principal case, since legal title to both parcels of land would remain in the
common owner. 12 However in cases where but one mortgage has been given,
such jurisdictions have held that an easement arises upon foreclosure. 13 Though
here it might be possible to find a severance, there is great difficulty in finding
any intent to create an easement.' 4 Throughout the mortgage cases the courts
are obviously warping established law to reach a practical result. That such a disparity between policy and legal theory exists, raises a question as to the adequacy
It is suggested as a possible
of the present rules as to implied easements.',
liberalizing technique that the possibility of a future severance through foreclosure, a fact upon which the instant court places great emphasis,'0 should be
treated as evidence of an intention of the parties to contract for the creation of
an easement in the event of foreclosure, a contract which might then be
specifically enforced.'" Most helpful would be a statute providing for the
creation by operation of law of an easement on foreclosure by virtue of the
grant of a mortgage unless expressly repudiated by the parties.

SALES-CHATTEL

MORTGAGES-RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE TO RECOVER FRO-M

THIRD PERSON FOR INJURY TO CHATTEL AFTER CONDITION BROICEN-M Ortgagor purchased a car and gave his instalment note and chattel mortgage on the
car in part payment. While the car was in mortgagor's possession, but after
mortgagor had defaulted in his payments, the car, being driven by the mortgagor, was totally destroyed as a result of the negligence of the defendant.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the mortgagee's petition praying damages for injury to the car. Held, that the mortgagee having waived his right to
possession by allowing the mortgagor to retain possession, the cause of action
was in the mortgagor. Judgment affirmed. Commercial Credit Co. v. Standard
Baking Co., 187 N. E. 251 (Ohio App. 1933).
" Murphy v. Welch, supra note I.

" See cases supra note 4; cf. note 9, smpra.

"Malsberger v. Parsons, 24 Del. 254, 75 Ati. 698

(i9IO)

; Dawson v. Peter, n19 Mich.

274, 77 N. W. 997 (1899).

IJohn Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, io3 Ind. 582, 2 N. E. i8s (1885) ; Carrig v.
First National Bank, 136 Iowa 261, 111 N. W. 329 (1907).
1 The same criticism may be made of easements created on levy of execution upon part
of one's property. Schmidt v. Quinn, 136 Mass. 575 (1884).
"A California statute providing for the creation o~f easements upon severance of ownership of land makes no provisions as to any intent. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § n1o4;

Pendola v. Ramm, 138 Cal. 517, 71 Pac. 624 (1903).

"Supra note 6.
"There is an analogy to this situation under the rule of Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267
(Pa. 1826) which is in the minority in holding that an oral license which has been acted upon
by the licensee, so that a revocation would involve great detriment to him, becomes irrevocable, creating in effect the same legal consequences as an easement. Contra: Crosdale v.
Cf. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS RUqNING WITl
Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 6o4, 29 N. E. 824 (892).
THE LAND (929)

46 et seq.; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, i208 et seq. The majority's

objection-that under the Statute of Frauds an interest in land must be created by grant-is
at least partially obviated in the suggested situation. There is in such case a grant in titlemortgage states, and in lien-mortgage states there is what is pretty nearly equivalent-a grant
of an interest in land recognized in equity.
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Before default, the mortgagee, not having any right to possession by virtue
of the mortgage, may maintain an action only for injury to his reversionary
interest or for damage to his security.1 On condition broken, the mortgagee
has an immediate right to possession 2 and may maintain trover,8 trespass,4
replevin, 5 or case 6 against a third person. The right to possession, however,
may be waived by the mortgagee, but it has been generally held, in contradistinction to the principal case, that some affirmative act on the part of the mortgagee was necessary to constitute a waiver of this right.' Moreover, whatever
effect with respect to the mortgagee's right to possession should be held to proceed from his merely allowing the mortgagee to remain in possession for a short
time, it should not be construed as a waiver also of his right to look to the chattel
for security. After default the mortgagor's possession would at least be permissive and the mortgagee should have the rights and actions of a bailor under
a bailment at will.8 In denying a right of action to the mortgagee ' the court in
the principal case was influenced by two considerations of policy: (I) to give
the mortgagee a right of action might foster collusive injuries to mortgaged
chattels in order to obtain a cause for damages against a third person as a means
of securing payment of the mortgage debt; and (2) the third person might be
compelled to respond twice in damages. On analysis these reasons do not
appear to justify the court's decision. By holding that the right of action is
solely in the mortgagor the court opens the way for collusion between the mortgagor and the third person so that the mortgagor will lose his suit or fail to
prosecute it diligently. 10 As to the fear of a possible double liability, a recovery
'Ayer v. Bartlett, 26 Mass. 156 (1829) ; Forbes v. Parker, 33 Mass. 462 (1835); Cres-

bard Grain Co. v. Farnham, 244 N. W. 91 (S. D. 1932) ; Fouts Bros. v. Ayres, ii Tex. Civ.
App. 338, 32 S. W. 435 (1895). See Berlein v. Eddy, 89 Fla. 484, 487, 104 So. 780, 781
(1925); Manning v. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539, 545 (861).
2 JoNES, CHATrr MORTGAGES
AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) § 449.
' The mortgagee has this right whether the court considers a chattel mortgage as passing
title to the mortgagee, or as giving the mortgagee only a lien on the chattel, title being in the
mortgagor.

I JONES, op. cit. supra note I, § i.

'Burton v. Jennings, 158 Md. 254, 148 Atl. 424 (1929);

Stamps v. Gilman & Co., 43

Miss. 456 (1870) ; Sandager v. Northern Pacific Elevator Co., 2 N. D. 3, 48 N. W. 438 (1891) ;
Eade v. First Nat. Bank, 117 Ore. 47, 242 Pac. 833 (1926).
' Woodruff v. Halsey, 25 Mass. 333 (1829) ; Welch v. Whittemore, 25 Me. 86 (1845) ;
Carter v. Haynes, 269 S. W. 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 925).
'Lathrop v. Cheney, 29 Neb. 454, 45 N. W. 617 (189o) ; Fusbee v. Langworthy, i iWis.
375 (186o) ; Schlessinger v. Cook, 9 Wyo. 256, 62 Pac. 152 (19oo). See Kellogg v. Anderson, 40 Minn. 207, 41 N. W. 1045 (1889).
' O'Brien v. Miller, 117 Fed. iooo (D. Conn. 19o2) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, lO7 N. J. L. 17, 15o Atl. 235 (1930) (conditional sale after condition broken) ; Wylie
v. Ohio River & Charlestown R. R., 48 S. C. 405, 26 S. E. 676 (1896) ; 2 JONEs, op. cit. supra
note i, § 706; I SEDGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 81.
'Van Loan v. Willis, 13 Daly 281 (N. Y. 1885)1 (demand of payment after default);
West v. Crary, 47 N. Y. 423 (1892) (acceptance of payment) ; McMillan v. Grayston, 83 Mo.
App. 425 (19oo) ; cf. Dane v. Mallory, 16 Barb. 46 (N. Y. 1852) (refiling of mortgage is
not waiver of right to possession) ; Weeks v. First State Bank of DeKalb, 2o7 S. W. 973
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (inaction with knowledge that the mortgagor was trying to sell the
mortgaged chattel in order to pay the mortgage debt was held not a waiver).
'Roach v. St. Louis Type Foundry, 21 Mo. App. ii8 (1886); Burdick v. McVarner, 2
Denio 170 (N. Y. 1846) ; Fidelity Loan Ass'n v. Connolly, 92 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1905) ; Flenniken v. Scruggs, 15 S. C. 88 (88o); I COBBEY, CHATTE. MORTGAGES (1893) § 484;
HOL ES, COMMON LAW (1881) 171, 175.
' The court expressly reserves the question as to what its decision would be if the mortgagee first made demand upon the mortgagor to bring suit and the mortgagor refused.
10 Since the court in the principal case recognizes that the mortgagor, when he recovers
against the third party, holds the money in trust for the mortgagee.
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by either the mortgagor or the mortgagee would be a bar to another action. 1
Perhaps the real solution is to compel the mortgagor or the mortgagee, in a suit
by one of them, to join the other and thus adjust the rights of all parties in one
suit.',
TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIABILITY OF INSANE PERSON FOR SLAN-

DER-Defendant, in the presence of a number of persons, falsely accused plaintiff
of having immoral relations with defendant's wife. Defendant was suffering
from insane delusions as to his wife's morality, though he was apparently sane on
all other matters. Since this condition was known to the persons present the
charge was not believed, and plaintiff sustained no actual damage. In an action
of slander, the verdict was for defendant. Held, that the verdict would not be
disturbed. Wilson v. Walt, 25 Pac. (2d) 343 (Kan. 1933).
Since the defamatory words of the defendant were actionable per se,1 the
plaintiff had a right of action though he sustained no actual damage. 2 The
defense of insanity raises the unique question of the liability of insane persons
for torts of this type. It is generally accepted that insanity ought not to be a
defense to an action to recover compensation for actual damage.3 Although
this principle has in the decided cases been limited to situations where the plaintiff
4
has suffered physical injuries to his person or property, there seems to be no

valid reason, despite authority to the contrary,5 why the principle should not apply
to cases of defamation.6 The instant case, however, does not come within this
'Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 19o N. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319 (1925) ; see Smith v.
James, 7 Cow. 328 (N. Y. 827); 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note I, § 447a; Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act § 4o, Third Tentative Draft in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONE.RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs (1926) 437.
'See, for example, PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 12, § 141; OHIO CODE ANN.
(Throckmorton, 1930) § 11262; CLARK, CODE PtEADING (1928) § 64; I SUTHERLAND, CODE
PLEADING AND PRACrIcE (i9o) § 655. This procedure would be especially effective in deciding the rights of all parties where the mortgagor has been guilty of contributory negligence.

I Imputations of adultery are actionable per se in Kansas. Bashford v. Wells, 78 Kan.
295, 96 Pac. 663 (I9O8) ; Batten v. Cox, 118 Kan. 78, 233 Pac. 1040 (1925).
'Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041 (1904) ; 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th
ed. 1916) § 1204.
It is regarded as socially desirable to restore the plaintiff's loss at the lunatic's expense,
even though the latter, because of his condition, is morally blameless. See I CooLEY, TORTS
(4th ed. 1932) § 65. See criticism of this theory in Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Iifants and
Insane Persons (924) 23 MIcH. L. Rxv. 9, 34n.
IJewell v. Colby, 66 N. H. 399, 24 Atl. 902 (189i) ; Mutual Fire Ins. Co, v. Showalter,
3 Pa. Super. 452 (3897) ; Bohlen, supra note 3.
' The few decisions and more numerous dicta upon the subject are almost unanimously to
the effect that insanity is a complete defense to an action for libel or slander. Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306, 77 S. W. iio6 (19o4) ; Bryant v. Jackson, 6 Humph. 199 (Tenn. 1845) ; cf.
Horner v. Marshall's Adm., 5 Munf. 466 (Va. 187) ; see Gates v. Meredith, 7 Ind. 440, 441
(1856) ; Young v. Young, 141 Ky. 76, 79, 132 S. W. 155, 157 (1p1o) ; Feld v. Borodofsky,
87 Miss. 727, 731, 4o So. 816 (i9O6).
0 See Ullrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. i68, 170, 5o N. Y. Supp. 788, 790 (898);
Bohlen, supra note 3, at ign. The instant court appears to favor this view; it quotes with
approval a passage from 32 C. J. 750, including the following: "If malice is not necessary in
order to recover actual damages done by an unprivileged libel or slander, an insane person
may be liable to the extent of the actual damage caused by his libel or slander. . . ." See
instant case, at 344. The reason usually given for denying liability is that "malice" is
an ingredient of libel and slander, and an insane person is incapable of "malice". But it is
clear that "malice" need not be proved to recover compensatory damages unless privilege is
shown, though courts often speak of "malice in law" being "conclusively presumed". See
Smith, Jones v. Hultow: Three Conflicting Judicial Views as te a Question of Defamation
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principle, since it is not an action to recover compensation. A rule more appropriate to the present situation is that which denies the liability of insane persons
for exemplary damages.7 The reason for this rule appears to be that since the
purpose of exemplary damages is primarily to admonish the defendant,8 and
since admonition of a person irresponsible for his acts and motives would generally be a fruitless gesture, an award of these damages against such a person
would fail of its objective. This reason applies with equal force to justify a rule
which denies a right of action (as distinguished from a right to recover damages
of a particular type) when the circumstances are such as to defeat the purposes
for which the right is normally given. The functions of an action for defamation, when no actual damage is sustained, appear to be the public vindication of
the plaintiff's character,' the substitution of legal process for private revenge of
a supposed personal affront,1" and the deterrence of the defendant from a repetition of the undesirable conduct. None of these functions would be performed
if such an action were sustained against one irresponsible because of insanity"
who defames the plaintiff in the presence of persons who are acquainted with his
condition and give no credence to his words. His utterance under such circumstances is hardly a stigma upon the plaintiff's name requiring public purgation,
or an insult likely to provoke an act of revenge; the infliction of punishment
upon him is little apt to affect his future behavior. The instant decision can
therefore be readily justified without resorting to the generalization that an insane
person is not liable in any case of libel or slander.1 (1912) 6o U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 365, 371. Of course the fact of insanity may be used talshow
that no actual damage was caused, as in the instant case. See Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass.
224, 227 (1812).

'See Phillips v. Ward, 241 Ky. 25, 28, 43 S. W. (2d) 331, 334 (1931) ; Ward v. Conatser, 63 Tenn. 64, 66 (1874) ; Ullrich v. New York Press Co., siupra note 6, at 170, 50 N. Y.
Supp. at 790.
'See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1175.
'See Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24, 26 (1825).
1 See Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (1903) 3 CoL. L. Rzv.
546, 563. The action for defamation was early recognized as a means of preserving the peace.
See Baker v. Pierce, 6 Mod. 23,
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(Eng. 1703).

' Under what circumstances an insane person is to be regarded as legally irresponsible
is a question which has greatly perplexed courts in the criminal law; it would appear to be of
little profit to introduce the confusion which has resulted into the law of torts. The instant
case, in holding that the jury was warranted in finding for the defendant on the ground of his

insanity, adopts the best rule developed in the criminal law: that the defendant's claim of irresponsibility by reason of insanity raises a question of fact, to be decided by the triers of fact,
without the aid or hindrance of legal formulas. State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871).
'The instant decision is not necessarily authority for exempting an insane person from
liability for utterances actionable per se in either of the following situations: (I) Where the
persons in whose presence the words are spoken believe that the defamation is true. (In this
situation the plaintiff suffers actual injury to his reputation, whether or not the defendant's
condition is known to his hearers.) (2) Where the persons in whose presence the words are
spoken do not know of the defendant's condition, but do not believe that the defamation is
true. (In this situation the plaintiff suffers no actual injury to his reputation, but it might
be said that he deserves a public purgation of the deliberate aspersion upon his character by
an apparently responsible person.) Cf. Markham v. Russell, 12 Allen 573 (Mass. 1866).

